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I. Introduction
Right-wing extremism is a serious problem in many societies, not so much because of its eco-
nomic costs, but rather because it questions fundamental values such a equality and integrity
of all individuals and because of its severe impact on victims (Leets, 2002; Nielsen, 2002).
Germany, for example, has witnessed several fatal assaults on foreigners.1 While these assaults
received considerable attention, they are just the most severe examples of crimes with a racist,
xenophobic, and/or anti-Semitic background (henceforth right-wing extremist crimes). For
example, more than 10,000 right-wing extremist crimes per year were officially registered in
Germany from 1996 to 1999.2 More than 90 percent of these crimes were non-violent crimes,
usually involving propaganda offences. Among violent crimes, 65 percent of the cases were
hate crimes against the foreign population. Clearly, however, this phenomenon is not limited
to Germany. In the US, the FBI recorded about 8,000 right-wing extremist crimes per year
between 1998 and 2002. Great Britain has witnessed a dramatic increase of this type of crime
from 13,878 cases in 1998 to 54,370 cases in 2002 (Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice
System). Similar numbers are available for other OECD countries. While different classifica-
tions and legislations make a cross country comparison impossible, the numbers nonetheless
demonstrate the severity of the problem and the need for a better understanding of its causes.
In Germany, the extent of right-wing extremist crimes is particularly problematic in the
Eastern states, the former communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). The incidence of
right-wing extremist crimes between 1996 and 1999 was 50 percent higher in Eastern states
than in the Western states. Two competing hypotheses have been advanced as to why the
incidence of right-wing crime is so much more pronounced in East Germany than in West
Germany. According to the first hypothesis, these differences exist because the socialization
between former communist East Germany and democratic West Germany was politically and
educationally very different. These political and historical differences and their different polit-
ical cultures appear in different preferences between East and West German citizens and have
remained intact following the German reunification (Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007). The
1In September 1991, asylum seekers were attacked in their home in Hoyerswerda. Similarly, asylum seekers
were attacked in pogrom-like riots in Rostock-Lichtenhagen in August 1992. Lethal fire assaults were committed
against Turkish foreigners in Mo¨lln (November 1992) and Solingen (May 1993).
2In comparison, there were about 6.5 million reported offences in the year 1997 overall, of which about 12,000
were classified as right-wing extremist crimes. Right-wing extremist crimes thus comprise only a small fraction
of all registered crimes. However, we believe the absolute number of committed crimes indicates very little
about the severity of different types of criminal acts.
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political heritage of the GDR may have generated more hostile attitudes towards immigrants
and groups with other ethnic origin.
The second hypothesis stresses the particularly strong economic hardship in East Germany,
characterized not least by a substantially higher unemployment rate than in the Western
states. This alternative explanation postulates that higher unemployment in Eastern states
may be a major cause for the occurrence of right-wing extremist crime. The argument that
unemployment may be an important driving force behind right-wing extremist sentiments
is prominent among historians. Several studies have argued that high unemployment rates
facilitated the rise of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s (Fischer and Modigliani, 1978).3
An empirical analysis of voting behavior on the state level further supports this hypothesis
Frey and Weck (1981).4 The relative deprivation theory offers a possible explanation for this
relation (Hofstadter, 1963; Lipset, 1963; Falter and Klein, 1994). According to this theory,
unemployment or the threat of becoming unemployed causes a loss in status and feelings of
deprivation. The perceived gap between people’s expectations and achievements may trigger
anxieties; these may, in turn, transform into negative feelings towards and reactions to groups
like immigrants and asylum seekers (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Runciman and Bagley, 1969).
As a consequence, people may even develop a preference for authoritarian leaders, an anti-
foreigner ideology, and violent predispositions (for example, see Turpin-Petrosino, 2002, on
students’ attitudes towards hate groups).5 In line with such arguments, Lubbers and Scheepers
(2001) show that that unemployed people have been more likely to support extreme right-wing
parties in Germany. However, and despite its intuitive appeal, previous empirical evidence on
the relation between right-wing extremist crime, racist crime, and/or crime against immigrants
on the one hand and unemployment on the other is rather mixed (as we discuss below).6
3To illustrate: the unemployment rate was 14.4 percent in 1930, and the Nazi Party NSDAP (National
Socialist German Labor Party) received 18.3 percent of the votes in the elections for the German Reichstag. In
the 1932 elections, when unemployment had reached a level of 26.6 percent, 37.3 percent of the voters voted
in favor of the NSDAP. Note, however, that the political environment in Germany at the onset of the great
depression is hardly comparable to the current situation. Hence a one-to-one comparison between the two eras
is clearly problematic.
4It should be noted, however, that even though increasing unemployment may have causally affected the
increasing support for the Nazi party, this does not mean that the unemployed voted predominantly for the
Nazis. In fact, an interesting recent paper by King et al. (2008) has recently shown that the unemployed voted
disproportionately for the communist party.
5A related literature on subjective well-being shows that unemployment significantly reduces subjective well-
being (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Yang and Lester
(1994) even show that the suicide rate of unemployed in the US is significantly higher than that of the employed.
6On a more general level, most studies find a significant association between unemployment and non-violent
forms of crime, but often no relation with violent forms of crime. See, inter alia, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
(2001) for the US, Carmichael and Ward (2001) for the UK, Fouge`re et al. (2009) for France, Edmark (2005) for
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In this paper we try to discriminate between these two explanations using crime statistics
collected by the German Federal Criminal Police Office. More specifically, we investigate
whether the considerably higher unemployment rates in the eastern states can explain the
large difference in right-wing extremist crime rates between East and West German states.
We use state-level data for the years 1996 to 1999 to estimate the association between the
incidence of unemployment and right-wing extremist crime rates.
Our main results are as follows. First, we find a significantly positive relation between
state level unemployment and the incidence of right-wing extremist crimes. Importantly, we
observe this relation to be robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects and state-specific time
trends. Second, we find that the much higher unemployment rates in Eastern states can
explain a large fraction of the difference in right-wing extremist crimes between East and West
Germany. To investigate the relation between unemployment and right-wing extremist crimes,
we estimate the impact of unemployment on right-wing crime separately for states with high
and low incidences of unemployment and we find a very similar impact of unemployment on
right-wing crime both in high-unemployment East German states and in high-unemployment
West German states. In contrast, we do not find any such relationship for low-unemployment
states. Thus the relationship between unemployment and right-wing extremist crimes is not
a particular East German phenomenon. Instead, our estimates point to the importance of
non-linearities: the relationship between right-wing crimes and unemployment only becomes
relevant once a critical level of unemployment has been exceeded.
We also study whether unemployment has differential impacts on violent and non-violent
right-wing crimes. As laid out in more detail in the next section, these two categories com-
prise very different types of crime. For non-violent crimes, all results are very similar to those
obtained from analyzing the total incidence of crime, including the non-linearity in the im-
pact of unemployment. On the other hand, we do not find a strong relationship between
unemployment and violent crimes.
A final interesting result shows that total unemployment predicts the incidence of right-wing
crime better than youth unemployment. Prima facie this finding is surprising since right-wing
criminals are typically young men between 15 and 25 years (Willems et al., 1993; Neubacher,
1998). One could therefore expect youth unemployment to affect these criminals more directly.
Sweden, and Entorf and Spengler (2000) for Germany. See also Freeman (1999) for a more general discussion
of the economic analysis of crime.
4
However, unemployment might not affect right-wing crime at the individual level, or might do
so only in a limited manner. In other words, crimes are not necessarily committed by those
who are actually unemployed and unemployment may thus affect right-wing crime in a more
complex way. One possible interpretation is that high unemployment increases the fear of
losing a job. This in turn may lower people’s willingness to support humanitarian values of
tolerance and altruism. As a consequence, the normative pressure against right-wing criminals
may deteriorate in a high-unemployment environment.
There are only few studies that investigate the hypothesis that current economic condi-
tions, such as unemployment, have a significant impact on crimes motivated by right-wing
extremist, anti-foreigner, or racist attitudes. One study that provides empirical support for
such a relationship is Dustmann et al. (2004), who investigate the determinants of racial ha-
rassment in the UK. Using individual data with information on self-reported experience of
racial harassment, they find that minority individuals in high-unemployment neighborhoods
are significantly more frequently harassed. They argue that this could either indicate “(...)
that unemployment provokes greater hostility in the expression of negative attitudes or (...) it
puts a pool of unemployed individuals into contact with others in circumstances where hos-
tile outcomes can easily occur” (p.23). These results differ from those in Green et al. (1998),
who study the determinants of crimes against non-whites (Asian, Latinos, and blacks) in New
York City. They find that racially motivated crimes are most frequent in predominantly white
areas and in areas that experienced strong in-migration of minorities. However, a higher local
unemployment rate among whites neither affects the incidence of such crimes, nor is there an
interaction between high unemployment and high in-migration of minorities.7
To the best of our knowledge, the only recent study that empirically investigates the im-
pact of unemployment on right-wing extremist crime in post-reunification Germany is Krueger
and Pischke (1997). They regress the incidence of anti-foreigner crimes in Germany on un-
employment rates in the period between 1991 and 1993. Lacking official data, they collected
county-level crime data on these crimes from newspaper reports. They report a significant
relation between unemployment and crime incidents. This relation, however, becomes insignif-
icant after controlling for the differences between East and West Germany. There are several
7See also Krueger (2003) who investigate the link between poverty (or low education) and politically mo-
tivated violence and terrorist activities. Using data on public opinion polls conducted in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, they find that support for violent attacks against Israeli targets does not decrease among those with
higher education and higher living standards.
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possible reasons why their result differs from ours: first, since they rely on newspaper data, the
precision of measurement is potentially questionable. Second, they only analyze violent crimes.
This is due to the fact that non-violent crimes are typically not reported in the newspapers. In
our data, which comprises both violent and non-violent crimes, the incidence of violent crimes
as a fraction of all crimes is only about 6 percent in West Germany and about 9 percent in East
Germany. Our sample comprises 44,403 crimes in absolute terms, whereas that of Krueger and
Pischke (1997) identified “only” 1,056 such crimes. They thus analyze only a relatively small
proportion of all committed right-wing extremist crimes. Moreover, as our results show, the
association between violent crimes and unemployment is much weaker than that of non-violent
crimes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the data
and some preliminary empirical evidence. We discuss our empirical strategy in section III. In
section IV we present and discuss our empirical findings. Section V concludes.
II. Data and Descriptive Evidence
To assess the role of unemployment on right-wing crime, we use official crime statistics (“Polizei-
liche Kriminalstatistik”). The data were collected by the Federal Criminal Police Office (“Bun-
deskriminalamt”) and had not been previously analyzed. The data set uses information re-
ported by the police departments in the various German states (“La¨nder”) on a monthly
basis.8 The Federal Criminal Police Office divides right-wing extremist criminal activities in
two classifications, namely “violent right-wing extremist crimes” and “non-violent right-wing
extremist crimes”. The former include offenses such as murder and attempted murder, bomb
and fire attacks, assault and battery, offenses against the laws relating to civil disorders, and
rioting. The latter include sedition, desecration of graves, threat/coercion, right-wing extrem-
ist propaganda, willful damage to property, and so on. While our empirical analysis below will
concentrate on the role of unemployment as a determinant of total right-wing crimes, we will
also examine the two subcategories of non-violent and violent right-wing crimes separately.
The focus of our analysis is on the number of registered right-wing extremist crimes (REC)
8Official crime records are well known to be prone to measurement error (Skogan, 1974). The most obvious
problem is reporting behavior of victims. It is also possible that the classification of right-wing extremist
criminal activity by the police varies across states and/or changes over time (e.g. as a consequence of increased
media attention). This is potentially important in the German case because the police fall under state, and not
national, jurisdiction, meaning that results may merely reflect state-differences in definitions and/or systematic
changes in these definitions over time (see also footnote 9 below).
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per 100,000 inhabitants and on the period from 1996 to 1999, a time with consistent available
data.9 More than 10,000 right-wing extremist crimes per year were officially registered within
this period, of which 93.2% were non-violent and 6.8% were violent right-wing crimes. Among
non-violent RECs, 65% were right-wing propaganda delicts and “other” right-wing extrem-
ist activities, and the remaining 35% of were hate crimes against foreigners and crimes with
anti-Semitic background. Among violent crimes, 65% of the cases were hate crimes against
immigrants.
Figure 1
Panel (a) of Figure 1 reports the total number of registered right-wing extremist crimes
per 100,000 inhabitants and the overall unemployment rate in Germany for the period 1996 to
1999. During this period, the total REC rate averaged about 1.4 crimes per 100,000 residents
and average total unemployment was about 12.7% in the same period. Panel (b) shows the
absolute number of non-violent and violent criminal activities. The total number of RECs
amounted to about 800 cases per month (1.4 cases per 100,000 residents) for non-violent RECs
and about 60 cases per month (0.1 cases per 100,000 residents) for violent RECs. While both
series show considerable fluctuations over time, none of them has a clear underlying trend
within the observation period (note, however, that trending behavior in the unemployment
rate may be an issue).
Figure 2
Do the data suggest any systematic relationship between REC rates and unemployment
rates? Figure 2 gives a first hint about this issue. In each panel, the horizontal axis refers to
the unemployment rate and the vertical axis shows REC rates per 100,000 residents. Panel
(a) pools all available month-state observations. This figure shows a clear positive correlation
between the unemployment rate and total REC rates. Panel (b) shows the aggregate time-
series relationship (i.e. each data point refers to the country-wide REC and unemployment
rates of a particular month), while panel (c) aggregates over time and shows the differences in
9There are two important breaks in the data. First, both the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Federal
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (“Bundesverfassungsschutz”) collected data on REC until the end
of 1995. From 1996 onwards, both offices registered only those offences as REC which the corresponding police
authority of the involved state reported as such. Second, in an attempt to harmonize the assessment and
reporting of politically motivated offences across the states, there was a major change in the collection and
registration of such crimes at the turn of the year 2000. We therefore only analyze data from the period 1996
until 1999.
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REC and unemployment rates across states. Overall, Figure 2 displays a very clear picture:
Both time-series and cross-sectional variation indicate a clear positive relationship between the
two variables of interest.
Table 1
One issue that received considerable attention in the German public debate relates to the
question whether right-wing criminal activities are primarily a problem of the “new states”, i.e.
the East German states that formed the communist German Democratic Republic. The issue
here is the extent to which the higher incidence of right-wing extremism in East Germany is
rooted in historical and political post-WWII differences, and the extent to which it is related
to the weak economic performance and, in particular, to the high unemployment rates in
the East. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on East-West differences in unemployment
and right-wing extremist crimes. In fact, East-West differences in right-wing extremist crimes
are dramatic: over the period 1996-1999, the total monthly REC rate in the Eastern states
amounted to 2.575 per 100,000 residents, almost three times as high as in the Western states
(0.914 crimes per 100,000 residents). Furthermore, the fraction of violent RECs was 9.2% in
East Germany, almost 1.5 times higher than in the West. Table 1 also shows the difference
in total unemployment and youth unemployment between the new and the old states. East-
West differences are also dramatic along this dimension. The average unemployment rate in
the Eastern states was 17.6%, in contrast to 10.5% in Western states. Panel (d) of Figure 1
plots the joint distribution of right-wing extremist crimes and unemployment separately for
observations from Eastern and Western Germany. Interestingly, East and West German states
do not differ much with respect to youth unemployment. The mean youth unemployment rate
of East German states over the observation period is 15.7%, compared to 12.2% in the West.
III. Empirical Strategy
The preceding evidence focuses exclusively on unconditional correlations between REC and
unemployment rates. It is clear, however, that not only levels of unemployment, but other
observed and unobserved state characteristics as well, may play a potentially important role
in explaining the incidence of REC rates across states and time. We also want to take general
trends in REC into account that may be completely unrelated to (trends in) unemployment.
8
Our first model is a simple two-way fixed effects model:
RECit = αi + URitβ + xitγ + λt + it, (1)
where RECit measures the number of right-wing crimes in state i and month t (with i =
1, . . . , 16 and t = 1, . . . , 48), URit denotes the overall unemployment rate, and xit is a vector
of additional time-variant state characteristics.10
Importantly, note that we include a full set of state fixed effects and a full set of time fixed
effects on a monthly frequency, denoted by αi and λt, respectively. Accounting for unobserved
differences between states is potentially important in the German case. On the one hand,
the data are generated by reporting of crimes to the police. Because the police in Germany
are under state (and not national) jurisdiction, observed REC differences may simply reflect
state-differences in REC definitions or crime reporting. Accounting for a flexible time trend is
probably important as well because idiosyncratic changes in definitions and reporting may exist
over time. The error term it captures unobserved (and time-varying) determinants of crime
rates and measurement and/or classification errors. The coefficient β captures the impact of
unemployment on crime and is of primary interest. In order to rule out any spurious correlation
that results from fluctuations in that variable across seasons in a year, we use the seasonally
adjusted unemployment rate throughout our analysis. Finally, the vector of coefficients γ
estimates the impact of other control variables on registered crime rates.
The second model relaxes the restrictive assumption of a common time trend across states.
Indeed, there are many other differences across states in Germany, particularly between Eastern
and Western states, that could have led to differential trends in REC-rates between states. For
example, changes in measurement and/or reporting error over time might differ across states.
To account for such state-differences in a flexible way, we estimate the following econometric
model:
RECit = αi + URitβ + xitγ + tδ1i + t2δ2i + it, (2)
with t = 1, . . . , 48. The main feature of this model, and the difference to the first model, is
that we have replaced the full set of time dummies with state-specific quadratic time trends
10It turns out that most control variables have relatively little variation within states (remember that our
data cover a relatively short period of time). We will therefore mainly rely on and discuss models that do not
include control variables.
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(note that the corresponding two parameters are indexed by i). Below we will see that the
distinction between the two models is important in our application.
Let us make some further comments on the empirical strategy. First, note that both
models represent associations at the level of the state, while the structural model of interest is
at the individual level. Therefore, both models are estimated by weighted least squares, using
the population size of the states as weights. Weighting by the population size of the states
is very natural when working with data that represent state-specific averages (Wooldridge,
2008). Second, to take potential serial correlation of the error term into account, we use
standard errors that are clustered at the state-level throughout, thereby allowing for arbitrary
correlation of the regression errors within states.11
IV. Results
The Relationship Between Unemplyoment and REC
Table 2 shows the impact of total unemployment on total REC rates under alternative speci-
fications in simple WLS regressions that do not include any observed state characteristics.12
Table 2
The first column of Table 2 shows the unemployment coefficient from a regression that
neither includes control variables, state fixed effects, nor any deterministic time trend. This
coefficient indicates that an increase in the unemployment rate by one percentage point signifi-
cantly increases the number of total REC cases by 0.168 cases per 100,000 residents. Evaluated
at sample averages, this implies an elasticity of total RECs with respect to unemployment of
1.61 (= (0.168 · 10.820)/1.127). The high R-Squared of about 0.5 underlines the close as-
sociation between unemployment and REC that was already evident in panel (a) of Figure
1.
We add both a full set of state dummies and a full set of time dummies on a monthly
frequency in the second column. The estimated unemployment coefficient is substantially
decreased but still positive. However the coefficient is only estimated very imprecisely in this
11Note, however, that clustered standard errors may be conservative and thus the standard errors we report
are likely to represent an upper bound.
12As mentioned, most of the observed state characteristics show very little variation within states. Indeed, it
turns out that the control variables do not play an important role in our results, at least if we allow for both
state fixed effects and state-specific time trends. Nonetheless, we present the results including the controls in
table A1 in the appendix.
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case (the standard error almost quadruples). To rectify this, we replace the fully flexible time
trend with a simple quadratic time trend, assumed to be common to all states. The comparison
between columns (2) and (3) shows that the standard error in the unemployment coefficient is
considerably lower in the model with the parametric time trend (however, the point estimate
also changes quite a bit).13 One potential shortcoming of the models shown in columns (2)
and (3) is the assumption of a common time trend across states.
The next two columns thus show models that allow for different time trends across states.
The most flexible way to do so is to include the full set of interactions between state dummies
and time dummies (on a quarterly frequency), i.e. we include 16 distinct time dummies for
each state in this specification. Corresponding estimates are shown in column (4) of Table
2. Allowing for nonparametric and state-specific trends has two interesting effects. First of
all, the unemployment coefficient again grows substantially larger: the point estimate is 0.362,
more than twice as large as the unconditional effect from column (1). Because the standard
error does not increase as much, the effect again becomes statistically significant. Second,
there is a substantial drop in serial correlation as shown at the bottom of Table 2.
However, using a model as flexible as that in column (4) subjects us to the risk of overfitting
the data. We therefore still allow for state-specific time trends in the next column, but we use
a simple quadratic time trend instead of the more flexible specification based on time dummies
with quarterly frequency. Note that this specification uses up only 48 (= 16 + 2·16) degrees of
freedom, while the former (more flexible) specification uses up 256 (= 16·16) of a total of 768
degrees of freedom. This model yields a point estimate of the effect of unemployment on REC
of 0.204, somewhat smaller than in the previous specification. A comparison of the standard
error of the unemployment coefficient shows that the model in column (5) gives a much more
precise estimate than the model in the previous column. Interestingly, most control variables
become statistically insignificant as soon as state-specific time trends are allowed (see Table
A1).
13Table A1 shows that the difference between using a nonparametric or parametric time trend (with respect
to the estimated unemployment coefficient) is much smaller when additional controls are included. Please
also note, however, that there are some unexpected results with respect to the models that include control
variables (compare columns (2) and (3) of Table A1). For example, the estimated effect of the percentage of
the population that is male and aged between 15 and 25 turns out to be statistically significant, but with a
negative sign (contrary to our expectation and to common sense). We find this result rather strange and believe
that it points to some kind of misspecification in the econometric model. Specifically, we suspect that some of
the regressors are endogenous (and should thus not be controlled for) and/or that the assumption of a common
time trend is inappropriate.
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Finally, the last column takes seasonality into account by including a full set of interactions
between calendar-month dummies and state dummies (i.e. we allow for a different seasonal
pattern in each state). This has no large impact on the unemployment coefficient, which is
still positive and statistically significantly different from zero (point estimate of 0.198).
To get a sense of the quantitative importance of the estimates, we calculate the effects
on the total REC rate predicted by a one-standard-deviation increase in the unemployment
rate, using the unemployment coefficient of the model shown in column (5) of Table 2 as
benchmark. The overall standard deviation in observed unemployment rates amounts to 3.732.
This implies that the impact on total REC rates predicted by a corresponding change in the
unemployment rate equals 0.761 (= 0.204 · 3.732). This compares to an observed standard
deviation of total REC rates of 0.874. Hence we conclude that increasing the unemployment
rate by one standard deviation predicts an increase in total REC rates equal to 87% of the
standard deviation of REC rates observed in the data. In any event, this suggests a strong
relation between unemployment and REC rates. However, we also acknowledge that some
potential problems remain with respect to identification and that we can not definitely settle
the causality issue.14
Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3 presents the results from some additional model specifications. First, we estimate
the model in first differences as an alternative way of eliminating any unobserved but time-
constant heterogeneity across states. Column (1) of Table 3 shows that very similar estimates
result independent of whether the model is estimated in differences or in levels (as long as
state-specific time trends are included).
Table 3
The next seven columns show several dynamic models, including either lags in the depen-
dent variable or lags in the unemployment rate. These models not only provide an alternative
way for dealing with serial correlation in the error term, they also allow us to test whether the
impact of unemployment on REC rates is lagged rather than immediate. More specifically,
14Specifically, the unemployment rate and the error term could be correlated due to several distinct reasons.
For example, it is possible that law enforcement increases in states wherewhen unemployment increases in states,
which would induce correlation between the unemployment rate and the error term (one could also argue the
other way around, however). We also note, however, that studies that instrument for the unemployment rate
suggest that such effects may have only a minor impact; see Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) or Fouge`re et
al. (2009), for example.
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columns (2) to (4) test for a lagged impact of the dependent variable. It turns out that both
3-month and 6-month lags do not have an important impact, but that the 12-months lag does,
suggesting some seasonal pattern in REC rates (see Figure 1). This is underlined by the fact
that the estimated first-order autocorrelation of the error term turns out to be insignificant
in this specific model. Nonetheless, estimating such a dynamic specification neither changes
the size nor the statistical significance of the unemployment coefficient. Columns (5) to (7)
add different lags in the unemployment rate. It appears that the relation between unemploy-
ment and right-wing crime is very immediate, as none of the lagged unemployment coefficients
turns out to be statistically significant. Finally, including different lags of both the dependent
variable and the unemployment rate at the same time yields qualitatively the same results,
as shown in column (8). In sum, the additional results of Table 3 suggest that the impact of
unemployment on right-wing extremist crimes is quite robust. Unemployment seems to have
a significantly positive and quantitatively important impact on right-wing extremist crimes.
Finally, the last two columns provide a simple test for the assumption underlying consis-
tency of our two estimators (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 284-285). The lead of the unemployment
rate should be statistically insignificant in the fixed effects model,. Indeed, we find that the
coefficient of the lead of the unemployment rate turns out to be small and statistically insignif-
icant. In the final column, we add the current unemployment rate to the model estimated
in first differences. In this case, the coefficient of the contemporaneous unemployment rate
should be statistically insignificant. Again the test turns out favorably, as the coefficient of
the current unemployment rate is very small and not statistically different from zero.
Accounting for REC-differences Between East and West Germany
An important issue in the German public debate has been whether the higher incidence of
right-wing extremism in East Germany is a phenomenon related to particular historical or
political circumstances, or whether it is due to the poorer economic conditions in East Ger-
many, in particular with respect to unemployment. Individuals in East Germany grew up in a
communist political system, while West Germans experienced democracy and a social market
economy. This political history and the associated differences in political cultures may have
strongly affected the preferences and attitudes of individuals in the two regions even after the
reunification of the country (Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007). The absence of political
participation under the communist regime may have led East Germans to distrust their own
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government and undermined democratic and liberal thinking. This may well have made East
Germans more receptive for extremist “ideologies” and activities. A second explanation em-
phasizes the particular economic problems to which East Germans are exposed. The process
of transition from a socialist to a market economy that began with the fall of the Iron Curtain
and the German reunification in the early 1990s imposed particular hardship on many indi-
viduals in East Germany. As a result of job loss and unemployment, many individuals found
themselves – at least in relative terms – to be economic losers. Unemployment is associated
with occupational downgrading, loss of human capital, and little hope for rapid and significant
improvement. The particularly bad labor market conditions in East Germany may have gen-
erated a social climate conducive to right-wing criminal activities. According to this view, the
high unemployment rates in the East, rather than other specific circumstances not necessarily
related to the labor market, explain the difference in the incidence of RECs between the old
and the new states.
We use the results above to shed light on this issue in the following paragraphs. We
take the results from our preferred specification as a benchmark (as given in column (4) of
Table 2). Assuming that this model is a reasonable description of the relation between REC
and unemployment, we can decompose the observed REC differences between East and West
Germany into (i) a component due to differences in unemployment and (ii) a component due
to other (observed and unobserved) differences between the two regions. In other words, we
use our estimated coefficient for the following thought experiment: to which level would East
German REC rates decrease if unemployment rates in East-Germany were to diminish to West
German levels? The East-West difference in total REC rates amounts to 1.741 (= 2.570 -
0.824), and the difference in average unemployment rates amounts to 8.062 percentage points
(see Table 1). Using our benchmark estimates, the predicted reduction in REC rates would
amount to 1.645 (= 0.204 · 8.062). In other words, about 64% of the observed REC-difference
between East and West Germany can be attributed to differences in unemployment.
Table 4
In Table 4, we analyze the origins of East-West differences in REC rates in more detail. For
instance, it could be that RECs in East Germany react more strongly to changes in unemploy-
ment than in West Germany. Alternatively, there could be non-linearities in the relationship
between unemployment and crime. One explanation for such a non-linear relationship may be
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related to the enforcement of social norms. We hypothesize that right-wing extremist crime is
an interactive process between right-wing extremist criminals and a large number of witnesses
who fail to enforce social norms against racist and anti-foreigner violence. If a critical level of
unemployment is reached, this willingness to enforce norms decreases disproportionately.15
To further explore this hypothesis, Table 4 proceeds in the following way (for comparison
reasons, the first column repeats the unemployment coefficient of our baseline specification).
First, in column (2), we introduce an interaction effect between a dummy variable indicating
an Eastern state and the unemployment rate. This allows us to test for differences in the
strength of the unemployment-REC relationship between the two regions. It turns out that
the point estimate of the interaction effect is positive and quantitatively large – indicating that
the incidence of RECs in East Germany indeed increases more strongly to a given change in
the unemployment rate. The estimated effect, however, is not statistically significant. We then
proceed by checking whether there are non-linearities in the relationship between unemploy-
ment and REC rates: at modest levels of unemployment, right-wing criminal activities may be
low and almost unrelated to rates of unemployment, but once a critical level of unemployment
has been reached, a further increase in unemployment strongly increases right-wing criminal
activities. In fact, Figure 2 suggests there may be non-linearities: it appears that there is only
a weak correlation at low unemployment levels but a strong one at higher levels. Column (3) of
Table 4 therefore allows for differential effects of unemployment on right-wing extremist crime
under high-unemployment and low-unemployment circumstances. To this end we include a
dummy variable, 1(URit > URit), in the regression that takes the value 1 if unemployment
in state i and month t is above the mean unemployment rate observed in the whole sample
(equal to 10.82%). We then interact this dummy with the difference between the observed
and the mean unemployment rate. This spline-specification allows for a piecewise linear rela-
tionship between the unemployment rate and REC. In particular, it allows us to test whether
the relationship between unemployment and REC rates becomes stronger when unemployment
exceeds its average value. The estimates reported in Table 4 support the explanation based
on a non-linear impact of unemployment on REC. When unemployment falls short of the av-
erage unemployment, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate hardly affects
15As an extreme example, we refer to the riots in the cities of Rostock and Hoyerswerda (in former East
Germany in 1991, mentioned in footnote 1), where foreigners were collectively attacked for several consecutive
days. Many residents who witnessed the riot not only tolerated the violence, but actually supported it by
applauding and verbally supporting it.
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total REC rates (the corresponding point estimate is very small, -0.002, and does not reach
statistical significance). In contrast, if unemployment is above average, a one percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate increases REC rates by 0.249 (= 0.251 − 0.002).
The remaining columns of Table 4 also allow for differential effects of unemployment on
right-wing extremist crime simply by including additional polynomial terms in our key regres-
sor. To ease interpretation, we use centered polynomials so that the coefficient on the first
polynomial term of unemployment directly corresponds to the marginal effect at the mean
unemployment rate. The estimates reported in Table 4 support the explanation based on a
non-linear impact of unemployment on REC. All three specifications imply that the effect of
unemployment on REC tends to get larger, the higher the unemployment rate is.
Non-violent Versus Violent Right-wing Extremist Crimes
The preceding results all relate to the incidence of total right-wing extremist crimes, i.e. to both
non-violent and violent crimes. As mentioned above, however, these two categories comprise
very different types of crimes. A separate analysis is therefore quite important for a better
understanding and an assessment of the costs of right-wing extremist crimes to society. Table
5 addresses this issue by showing respective results once REC rates are differentiated by non-
violent and violent crimes.
Table 5
The left panel of Table 5 shows estimates of the impact of unemployment on violent RECs
and the right panel shows analogous estimates for non-violent RECs. First, notice that the
estimated coefficient is smaller in absolute value in the violent REC regressions. This is due
to the fact that violent crimes make up less than 10% of all crimes.16 For violent crimes, the
pooled model without covariates shows a significant coefficient, which becomes insignificant
once we control for state fixed effects and state-specific trends. Again it may be interesting
to consider possible non-linearities as before for total crime rates. This is done in column
(3) of Table 5. In contrast to overall crimes, unemployment does not seem to affect violent
crimes significantly. While the corresponding point estimate indicates a steeper slope once
unemployment exceeds the average unemployment rate (as indicated by the positive coefficient
of the interaction term), this effect is not statistically significant. This result resembles that
16Note, however, that a violent crime has a far higher impact than a non-violent one in terms of severity and
damage.
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obtained by Krueger and Pischke (1997), who report no significant impact of unemployment
on predominantly violent right-wing extremist crimes for Germany in the early 1990s.
With respect to non-violent RECs (the right panel of Table 5), the result resembles that
obtained for total REC rates very closely. Columns (4) and (5) show that the coefficient of
unemployment estimated from the pooled model without control variables is highly statistically
significant, albeit somewhat smaller in size than in the total REC regressions. It becomes
somewhat larger once we allow for state-fixed effects and state-specific time trends. Allowing
for different unemployment coefficients for high- and low-unemployment environments yields
essentially the same picture as in the total REC regressions: unemployment has a strong
impact when unemployment is high, but it does not affect REC-incidence at lower levels of
unemployment.
Youth Unemployment Versus Total Unemployment
One could argue that a large pool of unemployed individuals implies a large pool of potential
offenders in right-wing extremist crimes. On the one side, it could be that the experience of
unemployment induces individuals to commit right-wing crimes. On the other side, REC may
reflect the general values in society, and economic hardship affects those values. In the latter
case, young culprits may commit these crimes due to the unemployment experiences of their
parents and relatives. To examine these hypotheses, we rerun some of the key regressions of
Tables 2 and 4 with the youth unemployment rather than the total unemployment rate as the
explanatory variable (see Table 6). The regressions remain identical in all other respects.
Table 6
The first two columns in Table 6 report the unemployment coefficients for the basic model
given by equation (2) and for the extended model that allows for differences in unemploy-
ment rates between high/low unemployment regions and East/West. A clear picture emerges
from these results: the youth unemployment rate (YUR) does not have a significant impact
on REC rates. All YUR coefficients of Table 6 are insignificant. Allowing for heterogeneous
unemployment effects yields a qualitatively similar picture to that above. However, the youth
unemployment coefficients are quantitatively smaller and statistically insignificant. When we
include the overall unemployment rate in addition to the youth unemployment rate, however,
it turns out that the overall unemployment rate remains highly significant and of quantitative
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magnitude comparable to the previous estimates, while the youth unemployment rate remains
statistically insignificant (the point estimate becomes even negative). We also included the
youth unemployment rate relative to the overall unemployment as an indicator of the preva-
lence of youth unemployment problems. Again, it turns out that overall unemployment is
the dominant variable, while the ratio of youth unemployment relative to total unemployment
is insignificant. In sum, our results suggest that the way unemployment affects crime is un-
likely to be through young individuals’ own unemployment experiences. The more plausible
mechanism is that overall unemployment leads to an erosion of values in society which induces
young individuals to commit right-wing extremist crimes. This is in line with Siedler (2006)
who shows that young individuals whose parents experienced unemployment are more likely
to commit right-wing extremist crimes.17
V. Conclusions
Our results suggest a strong and systematic relationship between regional unemployment and
the incidence of right-wing extremist crimes. First, we find a significantly positive relation
between state level unemployment and the incidence of right-wing extremist criminal activities.
The relation becomes significant once we control for state fixed effects and state-specific time
trends and take serial correlation of the error term into account. Second, we find that the
gap in unemployment rates between East and West Germany can almost entirely explain the
dramatic differences in right-wing extremist crime between the two regions. The result that
the relationship between unemployment and right-wing extremist crime is non-linear further
strengthens this conclusion. At low levels of unemployment, a one-percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate has a very small and statistically insignificant effect on the incidence of
right-wing extremist crimes. In contrast, this relationship becomes very strong at high levels
of unemployment. This suggests that right-wing extremist activities may become particularly
problematic once unemployment has reached some critical level. Our empirical analysis also
reveals a differential impact of unemployment on violent and non-violent right-wing crimes,
two categories that comprise very different types of crimes. Our results for non-violent crimes
are very similar to those obtained from analyzing the total incidence of crime, including the
17See also O¨ster and Agell (2007) who find an insignificant association between youth unemployment and
crimes in general. They argue that young culprits are often still in school and that their parents’ unemployment
experience may have negative spillover effects on the children.
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non-linearity in the impact of unemployment. In contrast, we do not find a strong relationship
between unemployment and violent crime.
In sum, our empirical evidence suggests a systematic effect of regional unemployment on
right-wing extremist criminal activities. The estimated effect is statistically highly significant
and quantitatively large. Notice, however, that our results do not imply that those who
are actually unemployed are more likely to commit right-wing extremist crimes. Despite the
fact that most crimes are committed by young men, youth unemployment does not have a
statistically significant effect on right-wing crimes. This result is consistent with the hypothesis
is that high unemployment may foster right-wing criminal activities not through the young
individuals’ own experience of unemployment. In contrast, right-wing extremist crimes should
be considered as the outcome of an interactive process between active right-wing extremist
criminals and passive witnesses (family, friends, society in general) who fail to enforce social
norms against racist and anti-foreigner violence. It not only requires psychopathic people
who are ready to lay violent hands on others, but also a large number of witnesses who fail
to enforce social norms against (anti-foreigner) violence. When many individuals experience
unemployment (or have a high risk of losing their jobs) the willingness to enforce such general
norms and values erodes, thus encouraging right-wing extremist criminal activities.
19
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Table 1: Right-wing extremist crime and unemployment in East and West Germany, 1996-1999
West
Germany
East
Germany Total Difference
Total right-wing extremist crime (REC) rate 0.829 2.570 1.127 1.741
(0.381) (1.118) (0.874) (0.332)
Violent crimes as fraction of total REC 0.057 0.087 0.062 0.030
(0.042) (0.061) (0.047) (0.019)
Unemployment rate (UR) 9.440 17.502 10.820 8.061
(2.243) (1.758) (3.732) (0.946)
Youth unemployment rate (YUR) 10.653 15.482 11.480 4.829
(3.277) (1.799) (3.572) (1.198)
Number of observations 528 240 768 768
Notes: The total REC rate corresponds to the total registered rightist extremist crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.
The youth unemployment rate refers to persons below age 25 only. The two unemployment rates are seasonally
adjusted. All table entries are weighted by the population size of the states. Standard deviations (columns (1)
to (3)) and standard errors (final column) in parentheses, respectively. Standard errors in the last column are
adjusted for clustering at the state level.
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Figure 1: Right-wing extremist crimes and unemployment, Germany 01.1996-12.1999
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